A folk theorem for one-shot Bertrand games

被引：41

作者：

Baye, MR

Morgan, J

机构：

[1] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA

[2] Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1999年 / 65卷 / 01期

关键词：

folk theorem; Bertrand paradox;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00118-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that bounded monopoly profits are essential for the uniqueness of the Bertrand paradox (zero profit) outcome. Otherwise, a folk theorem obtains for one-shot homogeneous product Bertrand games: any positive (but finite) payoff vector can be achieved in a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：59 / 65

页数：7

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