Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools

被引:108
作者
Fryer, Roland G. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
PAY;
D O I
10.1086/667757
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
As global policy makers and school leaders look for ways to improve student performance, financial incentives programs for teachers have become increasingly popular. This article describes a school-based randomized trial in over 200 New York City public schools designed to better understand the impact of teacher incentives. I find no evidence that teacher incentives increase student performance, attendance, or graduation, nor do I find evidence that these incentives change student or teacher behavior. If anything, teacher incentives may decrease student achievement, especially in larger schools. The article concludes with a speculative discussion of theories to explain these stark results. When I was in Chicago, our teachers designed a program for performance pay and secured a $27 million federal grant.... In Chicago's model-every adult in the building-teachers, clerks, janitors and cafeteria workers-all were rewarded when the school improved. It builds a sense of teamwork and gives the whole school a common mission. It can transform a school culture. (US Secretary of Education Arne Duncan, the National Press Club, July 27, 2010) This project would not have been possible without the leadership and support of Joel Klein. I am also grateful to Jennifer Bell-Ellwanger, Joanna Cannon, and Dominique West for their cooperation in collecting the data necessary for this project and to my colleagues Edward Glaeser, Richard Holden, and Lawrence Katz for helpful comments and discussions. Vilsa E. Curto, Meghan L. Howard, Won Hee Park, Jorg Spenkuch, David Toniatti, Rucha Vankudre, and Martha Woerner provided excellent research assistance. Financial support from the Fisher
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页码:373 / 407
页数:35
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