Defense innovation, technology transfers and public policy

被引:33
作者
Bellais, R [1 ]
Guichard, R [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Paris 09, IMRI, F-75775 Paris 16, France
关键词
defense technology; dual use; technology transfer; intellectual property rights; collaboration; transaction costs;
D O I
10.1080/10242690600645274
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The role of defense in national innovation systems is highly topical, because of the complexity of defense systems and the desire to get value-for-money from R&D investment, especially through the commercialization of defense-funded technology. In practice, external transfer has proved to be a difficult, labor-intensive process, which requires a strong commitment from both parties. Here, intellectual property rights (IPR) appear as a strong incentive for collaboration. Analyzing the lack of IPR culture in defense industries elucidates the difficulties and failures in spin-off attempts. We finally propose strategies leading to a market for defense-born technology.
引用
收藏
页码:273 / 286
页数:14
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