The mystery of zero-leverage firms

被引:294
作者
Strebulaev, Ilya A. [1 ,2 ]
Yang, Baozhong [3 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Georgia State Univ, Robinson Coll Business, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA
关键词
Leverage; Debt financing; Capital structure; Zero leverage; Financing decisions; Low-leverage puzzle; CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE; MANAGERIAL TRAITS; FAMILY OWNERSHIP; RISK-MANAGEMENT; AGENCY COSTS; BOARD SIZE; TRADE-OFF; DEBT; DECISIONS; LEASES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We present the puzzling evidence that, from 1962 to 2009, an average 10.2% of large public nonfinancial US firms have zero debt and almost 22% have less than 5% book leverage ratio. Zero-leverage behavior is a persistent phenomenon. Dividend-paying zero-leverage firms pay substantially higher dividends, are more profitable, pay higher taxes, issue less equity, and have higher cash balances than control firms chosen by industry and size. Firms with higher Chief Executive Officer (CEO) ownership and longer CEO tenure are more likely to have zero debt, especially if boards are smaller and less independent. Family firms are also more likely to be zero-levered. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 23
页数:23
相关论文
共 74 条
[1]  
Acharya V., REV FINANCI IN PRESS
[2]   Is cash negative debt? A hedging perspective on corporate financial policies [J].
Acharya, Viral V. ;
Almeida, Heitor ;
Campello, Murillo .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, 2007, 16 (04) :515-554
[3]   CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AGENCY COSTS, AND OWNERSHIP CONTROL - THE CASE OF ALL-EQUITY FIRMS [J].
AGRAWAL, A ;
NAGARAJAN, NJ .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1990, 45 (04) :1325-1331
[4]   Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 [J].
Anderson, RC ;
Reeb, DM .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2003, 58 (03) :1301-1328
[5]   Family-Controlled Firms and Informed Trading: Evidence from Short Sales [J].
Anderson, Ronald C. ;
Reeb, David M. ;
Zhao, Wanli .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2012, 67 (01) :351-385
[6]   Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the United States [J].
Anderson, Ronald C. ;
Duru, Augustine ;
Reeb, David M. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2009, 92 (02) :205-222
[7]   THE LEASING PUZZLE [J].
ANG, J ;
PETERSON, PP .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1984, 39 (04) :1055-1065
[8]   ANATOMY OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS - AN EXAMINATION OF JUNK-BOND ISSUERS [J].
ASQUITH, P ;
GERTNER, R ;
SCHARFSTEIN, D .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1994, 109 (03) :625-658
[9]   ALTRUISM IN THE FAMILY AND SELFISHNESS IN THE MARKET PLACE [J].
BECKER, GS .
ECONOMICA, 1981, 48 (189) :1-15
[10]   Inside the family firm: The role of families in succession decisions and performance. [J].
Bennedsen, Morten ;
Nielsen, Kasper Meisner ;
Perez-Gonzalez, Francisco ;
Wolfenzon, Daniel .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2007, 122 (02) :647-691