Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Informality

被引:90
作者
Almeida, Rita [1 ,2 ]
Carneiro, Pedro [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] IZA, Washington, DC 20433 USA
[2] World Bank, Washington, DC 20433 USA
[3] UCL, Inst Fiscal Studies, Ctr Microdata Methods & Practice, Dept Econ, London WC1E 6BT, England
[4] Georgetown Univ, Washington, DC 20057 USA
关键词
DETERMINANTS; UNEMPLOYMENT; INEQUALITY; EARNINGS; MARKETS; GROWTH; TRADE; MODEL;
D O I
10.1257/app.4.3.64
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Enforcement of labor regulations in the formal sector may drive workers to informality because they increase the costs of formal labor. But better compliance with mandated benefits makes it attractive to be a formal employee. We show that, in locations with frequent inspections, workers pay for mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. Wage rigidity prevents downward adjustment at the bottom of the wage distribution. As a result, lower paid formal sector jobs become attractive to some informal workers, inducing them to want to move to the formal sector.
引用
收藏
页码:64 / 89
页数:26
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