Why Do Some Firms Go Debt Free?

被引:62
作者
Byoun, Soku [1 ]
Xu, Zhaoxia [2 ]
机构
[1] Baylor Univ, Hankamer Sch Business, Waco, TX 76798 USA
[2] NYU, Polytech Inst, Dept Finance & Risk Engn, New York, NY 10003 USA
关键词
Capital structure; Dividend policy; Zero debt; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; AGENCY COSTS; MANAGERIAL DISCRETION; CASH FLOW; CORPORATE; INVESTMENT; EQUILIBRIUM; REPUTATION; DECISIONS; DIVIDENDS;
D O I
10.1111/ajfs.12009
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines debt-free firms. We find that favorable equity market valuation and borrowing constraints contribute to these firms' extreme debt conservatism. Small debt-free firms with little access to credit markets are seen to raise equity while paying high dividends. Large debt-free firms, generating more cash flows relative to their investment needs, often pay off their debt while paying high dividends. The results suggest that high dividends for small debt-free firms help them establish good reputations in equity markets, while high dividends for large debt-free firms reduce the agency costs of free cash flow.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 38
页数:38
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