Cooperation, punishment, and the evolution of human institutions

被引：114

作者：

Henrich, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Emory Univ, Dept Anthropol, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA

来源：

SCIENCE | 2006年 / 312卷 / 5770期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1126/science.1126398

中图分类号：

O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

Given the choice, people prefer institutional arrangements in which those who overconsume common-property resources are punished compared to those in which they go free.

引用

页码：60 / 61

页数：2

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