Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible

被引：75

作者：

Janssen, Marco A. ^{[1
]}

Bushman, Clint ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Arizona State Univ, Ctr Study Inst Divers, Sch Human Evolut & Social Change, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY | 2008年 / 254卷 / 03期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

public good games; group selection;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.017

中图分类号：

Q [生物科学];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

Altruistic punishment is suggested to explain observed high levels of cooperation among non-kin related humans. However, laboratory experiments as well as ethnographic evidence suggest that people might retaliate if being punished, and that this reduces the level of cooperation. Building on existing models on the evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment, we explore the consequences of the option of retaliation. We find that cooperation and altruistic punishment does not evolve with larger population levels if the option of retaliation is included. (c) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：541 / 545

页数：5

共 28 条

[1]

Acheson JamesM., 1988, The Lobster Gangs of Maine

[2]

Alexander R., 2008, The biology of moral systems

[3]

Axelrod R., 1984, The evolution of cooperation

[4] Group competition, reproductive leveling, and the evolution of human altruism [J].