Practical Cryptographic Civil GPS Signal Authentication

被引:149
作者
Wesson, K. [1 ]
Rothlisberger, M. [1 ]
Humphreys, T. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Austin, Austin, TX 78712 USA
来源
NAVIGATION-JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF NAVIGATION | 2012年 / 59卷 / 03期
关键词
RECEIVER;
D O I
10.1002/navi.14
中图分类号
V [航空、航天];
学科分类号
08 ; 0825 ;
摘要
A practical technique is proposed to authenticate civil GPS signals. The technique combines cryptographic authentication of the GPS navigation message with signal timing authentication based on statistical hypothesis tests to secure civil GPS receivers against spoofing attacks. The notion of GNSS signal authentication is defined in probabilistic terms. Candidate GPS signal authentication schemes are evaluated in terms of effectiveness and practicality leading to a proposal for incorporating digital signatures into the extensible GPS civil navigation (CNAV) message. The proposal is sufficiently detailed to facilitate near-term implementation of security-hardened civil GPS. Copyright (C) 2012 Institute of Navigation.
引用
收藏
页码:177 / 193
页数:17
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