PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GROWTH AS POLITICAL EQUILIBRIA

被引:41
作者
Asoni, Andrea [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词
Economic development; Institutions; Property rights;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-6419.2008.00554.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper presents a survey of the literature on property rights and economic growth. Different theoretical mechanisms that relate property rights to economic development are discussed. Lack of protection of property rights can result in slow economic growth through different channels: expropriation of private wealth, corruption of civil servants, excessive taxation and barriers to adoption of new technologies. The origins of property rights are also considered. Different theories are illustrated but more attention is paid to the 'social conflict view' and its success and limitations. The second part of the paper illustrates relevant empirical works on property rights and growth.
引用
收藏
页码:953 / 987
页数:35
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