The market for shareholder voting rights around mergers and acquisitions: Evidence from institutional daily trading and voting

被引：28

作者：

Bethel, Jennifer E. ^{[1
]}

Hu, Gang ^{[1
]}

Wang, Qinghai ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Babson Coll, Babson Pk, MA 02457 USA

[2] Georgia Inst Technol, Coll Management, Atlanta, GA 30308 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2009年 / 15卷 / 01期

关键词：

Shareholder voting rights; Institutions; Trading; PENSION FUND ACTIVISM; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; GAINS; INFORMATION; ARBITRAGE; INVESTORS; BEHAVIOR;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.015

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

020219 [财政学（含：税收学）];

摘要：

This paper explores the market for voting rights and shareholder voting around 350 mergers and acquisitions between 1999 and 2005 by examining institutional-investor trading and voting outcomes. Our results show institutions in aggregate buy shares and hence voting rights before merger record dates. This trading is not related to proxies for merger arbitrage or trading around merger announcements, and thus is not simply a continuation of the latter. Trading and buying before record dates are positively related to voting turnout and negatively related to shareholder support of merger proposals. We explore several possible interpretations of these results. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：129 / 145

页数：17

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