Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation

被引:61
作者
Hirshleifer, David [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Irvine, Paul Merage Sch Business, Irvine, CA 92697 USA
关键词
Investor psychology; regulation; salience; omission bias; scapegoating; xenophobia; fairness; reciprocity; norms; mood; availability cascades; overconfidence; evolutionary psychology; memes; ideology; replicators;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-036X.2007.00437.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
I propose here the psychological attraction theory of financial regulation - that regulation is the result of psychological biases on the part of political participants - voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and media commentators; and of regulatory ideologies that exploit these biases. Some key elements of the psychological attraction approach are: salience and vividness, omission bias, scapegoating and xenophobia, fairness and reciprocity norms, overconfidence, and mood effects. This approach further emphasises emergent effects that arise from the interactions of individuals with psychological biases. For example, availability cascades and ideological replicators have powerful effects on regulatory outcomes.
引用
收藏
页码:856 / 874
页数:19
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