Costs of banking system instability: Some empirical evidence

被引:133
作者
Hoggarth, G
Reis, R
Saporta, V
机构
[1] Bank England, London EC2R 8AH, England
[2] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
banking crises; fiscal costs; output losses;
D O I
10.1016/S0378-4266(01)00268-0
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper assesses the cross country 'stylised facts' on empirical measures of the losses incurred during periods of banking crises. We first consider the direct resolution costs to the government and then the broader costs to the welfare of the economy - proxied by losses in GDP. We find that the cumulative output losses incurred during crisis periods are large, roughly 15-20%, on average, of annual GDP. In contrast to previous research, we also find that output losses incurred during crises in developed countries are as high, or higher, on average, than those in emerging-market economies. Moreover, output losses during crisis periods in developed countries also appear to be significantly larger - 10-15% - than in neighbouring countries that did not at the time experience severe banking problems. In emerging-market economies, by contrast, banking crises appear to be costly only when accompanied by a currency crisis. These results seem robust to allowing for macroeconomic conditions at the outset of crisis - in particular low and declining output growth - that have also contributed to future output losses during crises episodes. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:825 / 855
页数:31
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