Bank capital regulation with random audits

被引：39

作者：

Bhattacharya, S

Plank, M

Strobl, G

Zechner, J

机构：

[1] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England

[2] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

[3] Univ Vienna, A-1010 Vienna, Austria

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL | 2002年 / 26卷 / 7-8期

关键词：

optimal bank closure rules; Poisson-distributed audits; excessive risks; underlying assets;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00045-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a model of optimal bank closure rules (cum capital replenishment by banks), with Poisson-distributed audits of the bank's asset value by the regulator, with the goal of eliminating (ameliorating) the incentives of levered bank shareholders/managers to take excessive risks in their choice of underlying assets. The roles of (tax or other) subsidies on deposit interest payments by the bank, and of the auditing frequency are examined. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1301 / 1321

页数：21

共 18 条

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