Curbing the Credit Cycle

被引:221
作者
Aikman, David [1 ]
Haldane, Andrew G. [1 ]
Nelson, Benjamin D. [1 ]
机构
[1] Bank England, London EC2R 8AH, England
关键词
FINANCIAL CRISES; MORAL HAZARD; EQUILIBRIUM; BOOMS; RISK;
D O I
10.1111/ecoj.12113
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Credit cycles have been a characteristic of advanced economies for over 100years. On average, a sustained pick-up in the ratio of credit to GDP has been highly correlated with banking crises. The boom phases of the cycle are characterised by large deviations in credit from trend. A range of mechanisms can generate these effects, each of which has strategic complementarity between banks at its core. Macro-prudential policy could curb these credit cycles, both through raising the cost of maintaining risky portfolios and through an expectations channel that operates via banks' perceptions of other banks' actions.
引用
收藏
页码:1072 / 1109
页数:38
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