Board meeting frequency and firm performance

被引:140
作者
Vafeas, N [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cyprus, Dept Publ & Business Adm, CY-1678 Nicosia, Cyprus
关键词
corporate governance; board of directors; board meeting frequency;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00018-5
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
For 307 firms over the 1990-1994 period, I find that board meeting frequency is related to corporate governance and ownership characteristics in a manner that is consistent with contracting and agency theory. The annual number of board meetings is inversely related to firm value. This result is driven by increases in board activity following share price declines. I further find that operating performance improves following years of abnormal board activity. These improvements are most pronounced for firms with poor prior performance and firms not engaged in corporate control transactions. Overall, my results suggest that board activity, measured by board meeting frequency, is an important dimension of board operations. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:113 / 142
页数:30
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