Social network contingency, symbolic management, and boundary stretching

被引:166
作者
Markoczy, Livia [1 ]
Sun, Sunny Li [2 ]
Peng, Mike W. [1 ]
Shi, Weilei [3 ]
Ren, Bing [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Dallas, Jindal Sch Management, 800 West Campbell,SM 43, Richardson, TX 75080 USA
[2] Univ Missouri, Kansas City, MO 64110 USA
[3] CUNY Bernard M Baruch Coll, Zicklin Sch Business, New York, NY 10010 USA
[4] Nankai Univ, Sch Business, Tianjin 300071, Peoples R China
关键词
symbolic management; corporate interlocks; CEO compensation; China; FIRM PERFORMANCE; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; STRUCTURAL HOLES; CEO COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION; ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK; CHINA; BOARD; PAY;
D O I
10.1002/smj.2072
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
020101 [政治经济学];
摘要
A firm's structural position within corporate networks may affect the extent to which it engages in boundary stretching practices. Since social norms support low CEO compensation, offering high CEO compensation in China can be seen as a boundary stretching practice. Setting up a compensation committee (CC) may be viewed as a form of symbolic management in China. We argue that firms operating within central corporate network positions opt to pay higher CEO compensation without engaging in symbolic management. On the other hand, firms operating in structural hole positions tend to either pay lower CEO compensation or use CCs as a symbolic management tool in order to pay higher CEO compensation. Our hypotheses are largely supported based on 7,618 firm-year observations in China. Copyright (c) 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:1367 / 1387
页数:21
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