The New York City high school match

被引：328

作者：

Abdulkadiroglu, A ^{[1
]}

Pathak, PA

Roth, AE

机构：

[1] Columbia Univ, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10027 USA

[2] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2005年 / 95卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/000282805774670167

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

收藏

页码：364 / 367

页数：4

相关论文

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