Softening competition by inducing switching in credit markets

被引:30
作者
Bouckaert, J
Degryse, H
机构
[1] Univ Antwerp, Dept Econ, B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium
[2] Tilburg Univ, CentEr, B-3000 Louvain, Belgium
[3] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Centrum Econ Studien, B-3000 Louvain, Belgium
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00215.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.
引用
收藏
页码:27 / 52
页数:26
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