Social norms and economic incentives in firms

被引：51

作者：

Huck, Steffen ^{[1
,2
]}

Kuebler, Dorothea ^{[1
,3
]}

Weibull, Joergen ^{[4
,5
,6
]}

机构：

[1] WZB, D-10785 Berlin, Germany

[2] UCL, London WC1E 6BT, England

[3] Tech Univ Berlin, Berlin, Germany

[4] Stockholm Sch Econ, Dept Econ, Stockholm, Sweden

[5] KTH Royal Inst Technol, Dept Math, Stockholm, Sweden

[6] IAST, Toulouse, France

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2012年 / 83卷 / 02期

关键词：

Social norms; Crowding out; Contracts; PEER PRESSURE; COORDINATION; MOTIVATION; GAMES; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2012.05.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents' desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the contract. Multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper incentives can arise. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：173 / 185

页数：13

共 35 条

[1] A THEORY OF SOCIAL CUSTOM, OF WHICH UNEMPLOYMENT MAY BE ONE CONSEQUENCE [J].