Relevance of voting power

被引:21
作者
Lane, JE [1 ]
Berg, S
机构
[1] Univ Geneva, Dept Polit Sci, CH-1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland
[2] Univ Lund, Dept Stat, S-22100 Lund, Sweden
关键词
constitutional analysis; cooperative game theory; power index method; power modalities;
D O I
10.1177/0951692899011003002
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Democratic decision-making in groups requires institutions that aggregate the preference of the choice participants into a collective choice under the restriction that no player is a dictator. Constitutions deliver alternative rules for democratic decision-making, the consequences of which are best analysed using cooperative game theory. The emergence of a power index literature in the 1980s reflects the relevance of this type of modelling of institutions for groups like the European Union, stating modalities of power for the players.
引用
收藏
页码:309 / 320
页数:12
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