Decentralized credit and monetary exchange without public record keeping

被引：19

作者：

Corbae, D ^{[1
]}

Ritter, J

机构：

[1] Univ Texas, Dept Econ, Austin, TX 78712 USA

[2] Univ Minnesota, Hubert H Humphrey Inst Publ Affairs, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2004年 / 24卷 / 04期

关键词：

search frictions; partnerships; gift-giving;

D O I：

10.1007/s00199-003-0418-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We relax a standard assumption on the matching technology in a search model of money. In particular, agents may remain in a long-term partnership as long as it is in their self-interest. With this simple modification, it is possible to support self-enforcing, intertemporal trade which resembles credit without a public record keeping device. We examine conditions for co-existence of currency and credit and the welfare gains/losses associated with the introduction of money.

引用

页码：933 / 951

页数：19

共 13 条

[1] Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information [J].