Effective siting of waste treatment facilities

被引:39
作者
Minchart, D [1 ]
Neeman, Z
机构
[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Ctr Rat & Interact Decis Theory, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel
[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Econ, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel
[3] Boston Univ, Dept Econ, Boston, MA 02215 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
NIMBY; LULU; hazardous waste; waste treatment; auctions; mechanism design;
D O I
10.1006/jeem.2000.1180
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A waste treatment plant or another essential but potentially unpleasant facility has to be built in one of n communities. We present a simple auction-like procedure that identifies the best location and determines a system of transfers that provide the host community with adequate compensation. The siting procedure is simple and effective and can be readily applied in real world situations. In addition, it is ex post budget balanced, ex post individually rational, and robust, and it induces bidding the true disutility (or close to it) as a focal strategy in many different environments. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
引用
收藏
页码:303 / 324
页数:22
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