Why expected utility theory is normative, but not prescriptive

被引：7

作者：

Baron, J

机构：

[1] Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6196

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1177/0272989X9601600103

中图分类号：

R19 [保健组织与事业（卫生事业管理）];

学科分类号：

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：7 / 9

页数：3

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[1]

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[2]

Baron J., 1985, Rationality and intelligence

[3]

Baron J., 1993, MORALITY RATIONAL CH

[4]

Baron J., 1988, THINKING DECIDING

[5]

Broome John., 1991, Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty, and Time

Cohen, BJ .

[7] CONSEQUENTIALIST FOUNDATIONS FOR EXPECTED UTILITY [J].

HAMMOND, PJ .

HASLAM, N ;

BARON, J .

[9] PROSPECT THEORY - ANALYSIS OF DECISION UNDER RISK [J].

KAHNEMAN, D ;

TVERSKY, A .

[10]

MCCLENNAN EF, 1990, RATIONALITY DYNAMIC