Motivating Entrepreneurial Activity in a Firm

被引：18

作者：

Bernardo, Antonio E. ^{[1
]}

Cai, Hongbin ^{[2
,3
]}

Luo, Jiang ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA

[2] Peking Univ, Guanghua Sch Management, Beijing, Peoples R China

[3] Peking Univ, Inst Econ Policy Res, Beijing, Peoples R China

[4] Nanyang Technol Univ, Nanyang Business Sch, Singapore 639798, Singapore

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2009年 / 22卷 / 03期

关键词：

D82; D86; G31; VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS; INEFFICIENT INVESTMENT; MORAL HAZARD; COMPENSATION; INFORMATION; INCENTIVES; MANAGEMENT; REPUTATION; INNOVATION; MARKETS;

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/hhn029

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine the problem of motivating privately informed managers to engage in entrepreneurial activity to improve the quality of the firm's investment opportunities. The firm's investment and compensation policy must balance the manager's incentives to provide entrepreneurial effort and to report private information truthfully. The optimal policy is to underinvest (compared to first-best) and provide weak incentive pay in low-quality projects and overinvest (compared to first-best) and provide strong incentive pay in high-quality projects.

引用

页码：1089 / 1118

页数：30

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