SoK: The Evolution of Sybil Defense via Social Networks

被引：89

作者：

Alvisi, Lorenzo ^{[1
]}

Clement, Allen ^{[2
]}

Epasto, Alessandro ^{[3
]}

Lattanzi, Silvio ^{[4
]}

Panconesi, Alessandro ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] UT Austin, Austin, TX 02042 USA

[2] MPI SWS, Zurich, Switzerland

[3] Univ Roma La Sapienza, Rome, Italy

[4] Google Inc, Mountain View, CA USA

来源：

2013 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY (SP) | 2013年

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1109/SP.2013.33

中图分类号：

TP301 [理论、方法];

学科分类号：

081202 ;

摘要：

Sybil attacks in which an adversary forges a potentially unbounded number of identities are a danger to distributed systems and online social networks. The goal of sybil defense is to accurately identify sybil identities. This paper surveys the evolution of sybil defense protocols that leverage the structural properties of the social graph underlying a distributed system to identify sybil identities. We make two main contributions. First, we clarify the deep connection between sybil defense and the theory of random walks. This leads us to identify a community detection algorithm that, for the first time, offers provable guarantees in the context of sybil defense. Second, we advocate a new goal for sybil defense that addresses the more limited, but practically useful, goal of securely white-listing a local region of the graph.

引用

页码：382 / 396

页数：15