A note on a value with incomplete communication

被引：7

作者：

Bilbao, JM ^{[1
]}

Jiménez, N ^{[1
]}

López, JJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Sevilla, Seville, Spain

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2006年 / 54卷 / 02期

关键词：

cooperative game; communication situation; consistency;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 [经济学];

摘要：

The Myerson's models on partial cooperation have been studied extensively [SIAM J. Discrete Math. 5 (1992) 305; Math. Methods Operations Res. 2 (1977) 225; Int. J. Game Theory 19 (1980) 421; 20 (1992) 255]. In [Game Econ. Behav. 26 (1999) 565], Hamiache proposes a new solution concept for communication situations. In this work, we analyze this value making some deficiencies clear and generalize this value to union stable cooperation structures emphasizing the differences in the extension. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：419 / 429

页数：11

共 12 条

[1]

The position value for union stable systems [J].