Hard-to-solve bimatrix games

被引:80
作者
Savani, R [1 ]
von Stengel, B [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Math, London WC2A 2AE, England
关键词
bimatrix game; computational complexity; Lemke-Howson algorithm; Nash equilibrium; support enumeration;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00667.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The Lemke-Howson algorithm is the classical method for finding one Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. This paper presents a class of square bimatrix games for which this algorithm takes, even in the best case, an exponential number of steps in the dimension d of the game. Using polytope theory, the games are constructed using pairs of dual cyclic polytopes with 2d suitably labeled facets in d-space. The construction is extended to nonsquare games where, in addition to exponentially long Lemke-Howson computations, finding an equilibrium by support enumeration takes on average exponential time.
引用
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页码:397 / 429
页数:33
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