Efficiency losses from tax distortions vs. government control

被引：11

作者：

Gordon, RH ^{[1
]}

Bai, CE

Li, DD

机构：

[1] Univ Michigan, Dept Econ, Ann Arbor, MI 48100 USA

[2] Boston Coll, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167 USA

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1999年 / 43卷 / 4-6期

关键词：

state-owned enterprises; privatization; tax distortions;

D O I：

10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00117-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Given the strong theoretical presumption that state enterprises are less efficient than private enterprises, why have countries often chosen state ownership? This paper explores the hypothesis that high tax rates can distort the decisions of private enterprises by enough that state ownership becomes preferable on efficiency grounds. The forecast is that state ownership should be seen primarily in settings with high (explicit or implicit) tax distortions to private behavior.

引用

页码：1095 / 1103

页数：9

共 7 条

[1]

BAI CE, 1997, UNPUB STATE OWNED EN

[2]

BERKOWITZ DM, 1997, UNPUB DECENTRALIZATI

[3] THE IMPACT OF THE 2-TIER PLAN MARKET SYSTEM IN CHINESE-INDUSTRY [J].