Anomalous behavior in a traveler's dilemma?

[1] Anderson LR, 1997, AM ECON REV, V87, P847

[2] Rent seeking with bounded rationality: An analysis of the all-pay auction [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1998, 106 (04) : 828 - 853

[3] A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1998, 70 (02) : 297 - 323

[4] ANDERSON SP, 1998, LOGIT EQUIIBRIA AUCT

[5] BASU K, 1994, AM ECON REV, V84, P391

[6] CAMERER C, 1999, IN PRESS ECONOMETRIC

[7] CAPRA C, 1998, LEARNING NOISY EQUIL

[8] Learning and incentive-compatible mechanisms for public goods provision: An experimental study [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1998, 106 (03) : 633 - 662

[9] Signalling and adaptive learning in an entry limit pricing game [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1997, 28 (04) : 662 - 683

[10] ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS IN COORDINATION GAMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1995, 63 (01) : 103 - 143

[1] Anderson LR, 1997, AM ECON REV, V87, P847

[2] Rent seeking with bounded rationality: An analysis of the all-pay auction [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1998, 106 (04) : 828 - 853

[3] A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1998, 70 (02) : 297 - 323

[4] ANDERSON SP, 1998, LOGIT EQUIIBRIA AUCT

[5] BASU K, 1994, AM ECON REV, V84, P391

[6] CAMERER C, 1999, IN PRESS ECONOMETRIC

[7] CAPRA C, 1998, LEARNING NOISY EQUIL

[8] Learning and incentive-compatible mechanisms for public goods provision: An experimental study [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1998, 106 (03) : 633 - 662

[9] Signalling and adaptive learning in an entry limit pricing game [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1997, 28 (04) : 662 - 683

[10] ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS IN COORDINATION GAMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1995, 63 (01) : 103 - 143