A matching model with endogenous skill requirements

被引：152

作者：

Albrecht, J ^{[1
]}

Vroman, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Georgetown Univ, Dept Econ, Washington, DC 20057 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2002年 / 43卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00012

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a labor market in which workers differ in their abilities and jobs differ in their skill requirements. The distribution of worker abilities is exogenous, but we model the choice of skill requirements by firms. High-skill jobs produce more output than low-skill jobs, but high-skill jobs require high-skill workers and thus are more difficult to fall. We use a matching model together with a Nash bargaining approach to wage setting to determine the equilibrium mix of job types, along with the equilibrium relationship between, worker and job characteristics, wages, and unemployment.

引用

页码：283 / 305

页数：23

共 27 条

[1] Why do new technologies complement skills? Directed technical change and wage inequality [J].