Strategic and welfare implications of bundling

被引：43

作者：

Martin, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Copenhagen, Inst Econ, Ctr Ind Econ, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1999年 / 62卷 / 03期

关键词：

bundling; strategic behavior;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00236-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A standard oligopoly model of bundling shows that bundling by a firm with a monopoly over one product has a strategic effect because it changes the substitution relationships between the goods among which consumers choose. Bundling in appropriate proportions is privately profitable, reduces rivals' profits and overall welfare, and may drive rivals from the market. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：371 / 376

页数：6

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