Resource Curse and Power Balance: Evidence from Oil-Rich Countries

被引：66

作者：

Bjorvatn, Kjetil ^{[1
]}

Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza ^{[2
,3
]}

Schneider, Friedrich ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] NHH Norwegian Sch Econ, Bergen, Norway

[2] Univ Marburg CNMS, ZEW Mannheim, Marburg, Germany

[3] Tech Univ Dresden, Dresden, Germany

[4] Johannes Kepler Univ Linz, Linz, Austria

来源：

WORLD DEVELOPMENT | 2012年 / 40卷 / 07期

关键词：

oil rents; balance of power; resource curse; NATURAL-RESOURCES; RENT-SEEKING; PANEL-DATA; INSTITUTIONS; SPECIFICATION; ENDOWMENTS; EMPLOYMENT; TESTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.03.003

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

We examine the role of political fractionalization in understanding the "resource curse". Using panel data for 30 oil-rich countries, we find that the income effect of resource rents is moderated by the political power balance. With a strong government, resource wealth can generate growth even in an environment of poorly developed institutions, while adding oil revenues to a weak government may have damaging effects on the economy. These results have important implications for the economic prospects of the oil-rich countries in the Middle East, which are currently undergoing profound political changes. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1308 / 1316

页数：9

共 36 条

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