A model of self-regulation

被引：20

作者：

Núñez, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Chile, Dept Econ, Santiago, Chile

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2001年 / 74卷 / 01期

关键词：

self-regulation; quality regulation;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00521-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper analyses reputation-based incentives for self regulation from a principal-agent perspective. We find scant incentive to monitor quality and expose fraud in self regulation. However, public parallel regulation can enhance the incentives to monitor quality and reduce fraud. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：91 / 97

页数：7

共 5 条

[1] Credence goods and fraudulent experts [J].