CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation

被引：194

作者：

Bushman, RM ^{[1
]}

Indjejikian, RJ ^{[1
]}

Smith, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CHICAGO,GRAD SCH BUSINESS,CHICAGO,IL 60637

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 1996年 / 21卷 / 02期

关键词：

CEO compensation; individual performance evaluation; agency theory;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4101(95)00416-5

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We investigate use of individual performance evaluation in CEOs' annual incentive plans. In contrast with relatively objective accounting and stock-price-based measures, individual performance evaluation may involve discretion and subjectivity, as well as nonfinancial and financial performance criteria. Based on agency theory, we predict that individual performance evaluation increases with the importance of growth opportunities relative to assets in place, length of product development and product life cycles, and noise in traditional financial measures. Using proprietary compensation data, we find evidence that individual performance evaluation increases with growth opportunities and product time horizon.

引用

页码：161 / 193

页数：33

共 31 条

[1] AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF CORPORATE-EXECUTIVES [J].