Multilateral bargaining

被引：127

作者：

Krishna, V ^{[1
]}

Serrano, R ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BROWN UNIV,PROVIDENCE,RI 02912

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1996年 / 63卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2298115

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study a multilateral bargaining procedure that extends Rubinstein's alternating offer game to the case of n players. The procedure captures the notion of consistency in the sense familiar in cooperative game theory and we use it to establish links to the axiomatic theory of bargaining.

引用

收藏

页码：61 / 80

页数：20

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