Liquidity and transparency in bank risk management

被引:52
作者
Ratnovski, Lev [1 ]
机构
[1] Int Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 USA
关键词
Banks; Liquidity risk; Regulation; Transparency; Basel III; PRIVATE BENEFITS; MONETARY-POLICY; INFORMATION; DISCLOSURE; MARKET; TRANSMISSION; UNCERTAINTY; COMPETITION; OWNERSHIP; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfi.2013.01.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Banks may be unable to refinance short-term liabilities in case of solvency concerns. To manage this risk, banks can accumulate a buffer of liquid assets, or strengthen transparency to communicate solvency. While a liquidity buffer provides complete insurance against small shocks, transparency covers also large shocks but imperfectly. Due to leverage, an unregulated bank may choose insufficient liquidity buffers and transparency. The regulatory response is constrained: while liquidity buffers can be imposed, transparency is not verifiable. Moreover, liquidity requirements can compromise banks' transparency choices, and increase refinancing risk. To be effective, liquidity requirements should be complemented by measures that increase bank incentives to adopt transparency. (c) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:422 / 439
页数:18
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