Do voluntary pollution reduction programs (VPRs) spur or deter environmental innovation? Evidence from 33/50

被引:89
作者
Carrion-Flores, Carmen E. [1 ]
Innes, Robert [2 ,3 ]
Sam, Abdoul G. [4 ]
机构
[1] SUNY Binghamton, Dept Econ, Binghamton, NY USA
[2] UC Merced, Dept Econ, Merced, CA 95344 USA
[3] UC Merced, Tony Coelho Chair Publ Policy, Merced, CA 95344 USA
[4] Ohio State Univ, Dept Agr Environm & Dev Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
关键词
Voluntary environmental programs; Regulatory enforcement; Environmental innovation; Count panel models; CHANGE-MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES; INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION; ENFORCEMENT; PARTICIPATION; US; DETERMINANTS; PERFORMANCE; INCENTIVES; MANAGEMENT; DEMAND;
D O I
10.1016/j.jeem.2013.05.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study whether a government-sponsored voluntary pollution reduction program (VPR) promotes or deters the development of new environmental technologies that yield future emission reduction benefits. Using a panel of 127 U.S. manufacturing industries defined by 3-digit SIC classifications over the 1989-2004 period, we estimate impacts of industry-level participation in the 33/50 program, a VPR initiated by government regulators in 1991, on industry-level rates of environmental patenting. We find that higher rates of 33/50 program participation are associated with significant reductions in the number of successful environmental patent applications five to nine years after the program ended. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:444 / 459
页数:16
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