Strict liability as a deterrent in toxic waste management: Empirical evidence from accident and spill data

被引:27
作者
Alberini, A [1 ]
Austin, DH
机构
[1] Univ Colorado, Dept Econ, Boulder, CO 80309 USA
[2] Resources Future Inc, Qual Environm Div, Washington, DC 20036 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeem.1999.1074
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines whether strict Liability imposed on polluters has reduced uncontrolled releases of toxics into the environment. We fit regressions relating spills of selected chemicals to the type of liability in force in a state and to state manufacturing activity. For some chemicals, spills are more numerous in states imposing strict liability. This could be: due to unobserved state characteristics, with small firms being responsible for a disproportionate number of spills, regardless of the liability structure. Alternatively, separate regressions for the two liability regimes suggest that only under strict liability are small firms responsible for a disproportionate number of spills. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:20 / 48
页数:29
相关论文
共 25 条
[1]  
ACTION JP, 1992, SUPERFUND TRANSACTIO
[2]   On and off the liability bandwagon: Explaining state adoptions of strict liability in hazardous waste programs [J].
Alberini, A ;
Austin, D .
JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS, 1999, 15 (01) :41-63
[3]  
BARNETT HC, 1994, TOXIC DEBTS SUPERFUN
[4]   BANKRUPTCY AND CARE CHOICE [J].
BEARD, TR .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1990, 21 (04) :626-634
[5]  
*ENV LAW I, 1995, AN STAT SUP PROGR 50
[6]  
*ENV LAW I, 1993, AN STAT SUP PROGR 50
[7]  
Fahrmeir L., 1994, MULTIVARIATE STAT MO, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4899-0010-4
[8]  
FOGLEMAN VM, 1992, HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEA
[9]  
GASTEL R, 1998, ENV POLLUTION INSURA
[10]  
Greene W.H., 1997, Econometric Analysis, V3rd ed.