A tale of two collectives: Sulphur versus nitrogen oxides emission reduction in Europe

被引:112
作者
Murdoch, JC [1 ]
Sandler, T [1 ]
Sargent, K [1 ]
机构
[1] IOWA STATE UNIV, AMES, IA 50011 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1468-0335.00078
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A theoretical model of emission reductions is specified that accounts for voluntary and non-voluntary behaviour regarding the adherence to the Helsinki and Sofia Protocols, which mandated emission reductions for sulphur (S) and nitrogen oxides (NOx), respectively. From this model, we derive an econometric specification for the demand for emission reductions that adjusts for the spatial dispersion of the pollutant. When tested for 25 European nations, the model performs well for sulphur cutbacks. Less satisfying results are obtained for NOx, because the model's assumption of a unitary actor at the national level is less descriptive. Collective action considerations indicate that sulphur emissions are easier to control than those of NOx.
引用
收藏
页码:281 / 301
页数:21
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