Community formation and fisheries conservation in Southern Thailand

被引:18
作者
Johnson, C [1 ]
机构
[1] Overseas Dev Inst, London, England
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1467-7660.00233
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
This article explores theories of community, common property and collective action by reflecting upon the management and enclosure of a coastal fishery in Southern Thailand. Its aims are threefold. First, it explores the incentives that motivated villagers to support and enforce this common property regime. Second, it considers the issue of leadership, investigating why certain individuals were willing to bear considerable costs on behalf of the fishery, while others were not. Finally, it examines the ways in which religion and ethnic identity helped to forge 'an image of community' on which collective action could thrive. It argues that age, gender and class had a profound impact on the extent to which individuals could engage in this important socio-political activity. In so doing, it illustrates the dynamic ways in which power, structure and historical social relations can shape community, common property and collective action.
引用
收藏
页码:951 / 974
页数:24
相关论文
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