Tangible Information and Citizen Empowerment: Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia

被引：69

作者：

Banerjee, Abhijit ^{[1
]}

Hanna, Rema ^{[2
]}

Kyle, Jordan ^{[3
]}

Olken, Benjamin A. ^{[1
]}

Sumarto, Sudarno ^{[4
,5
]}

机构：

[1] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

[2] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] Int Food Policy Res Inst, Washington, DC 20036 USA

[4] TNP2K, Cambridge, MA USA

[5] SMERU Res Inst, Cambridge, MA USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2018年 / 126卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

FIELD EXPERIMENT; PUBLIC FUNDS; CORRUPTION; CAPTURE; UGANDA; COSTS;

D O I：

10.1086/696226

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

020101 [政治经济学];

摘要：

Redistribution programs in developing countries often leak because local officials do not implement programs as the central government intends. We study one approach to reducing leakage. In an experiment in over 550 villages, we test whether mailing cards with program information to targeted beneficiaries increases the subsidy they receive from a subsidized rice program. On net, beneficiaries received 26 percent more subsidy in card villages. Ineligible households received no less, so this represents substantially lower leakage.

引用

页码：451 / 491

页数：41

共 26 条

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