Inside the welfare contract: Discretion and accountability in state welfare administration

被引:226
作者
Brodkin, EZ
机构
[1] UNIV CHICAGO,SCH LAW,CHICAGO,IL 60637
[2] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,JOINT CTR POVERTY RES,EVANSTON,IL 60208
关键词
D O I
10.1086/604228
中图分类号
C916 [社会工作、社会管理、社会规划];
学科分类号
1204 ;
摘要
This detailed case study of the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program in Chicago highlights problems that arise when state agencies have discretion in administering a welfare contract built around work. The day-to-day operations observed in this study reveal the role bureaucratic discretion plays in giving specific meaning to the welfare contract. The study also identifies contextual factors that influence how state welfare agencies respond to their policy obligations at the street level. It illuminates the risks of welfare reforms that increase state administrative flexibility under conditions of limited resources and minimal accountability for performance.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 33
页数:33
相关论文
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