Effects of perspective and belief on analytic reasoning in a scientific reasoning task

被引:14
作者
Beatty, Erin L. [1 ]
Thompson, Valerie A. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Lancaster, Dept Psychol, Fylde Coll, Lancaster LA1 4YF, England
[2] Univ Saskatchewan, Dept Psychol, Saskatoon, SK S7N 0W0, Canada
关键词
Analytic thinking; Dual process theory; Individual differences; Prior beliefs and reasoning; Perspective; Scientific reasoning; COGNITIVE-ABILITY; BIAS; THINKING; REFLECTION; HEURISTICS; CONFLICT;
D O I
10.1080/13546783.2012.687892
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
The purpose of these studies was to test the hypothesis that changing perspectives from one's own to another's promotes the engagement of analytic processing and, in turn, reduces the impact of beliefs. In two experiments participants evaluated research vignettes containing belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent conclusions, and indicated whether the data supported a correlation between two variables. Consistent with our hypothesis, the tendency to endorse correlations consistent with prior belief was reduced when participants evaluated the data from the researcher's perspective relative to their own. We also administered the Actively Open Minded Thinking (AOT) scale (Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008), which did not predict belief effects on our task. We did however observe that the AOT was reliably associated with different response strategies: high AOT scorers were more inclined to choose ambiguous response options, such as "no conclusion is warranted", whereas low scorers evinced a preference for more determinate options (e.g., there is no relationship between the two variables). We interpret our findings in the context of dual process theories of reasoning and from a Bayesian perspective.
引用
收藏
页码:441 / 460
页数:20
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