Does it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking

被引:43
作者
Berger, Allen N. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Kick, Thomas
Koetter, Michael [4 ]
Schaeck, Klaus [5 ]
机构
[1] Univ S Carolina, Moore Sch Business, Columbia, SC 29208 USA
[2] Univ Penn, Wharton Financial Inst Ctr, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[3] Tilburg Univ, Ctr Econ Res CentER, Tilburg, Netherlands
[4] Frankfurt Sch Finance & Management, D-60314 Frankfurt, Germany
[5] Bangor Univ, Bangor Business Sch, Bangor, Gwynedd, Wales
关键词
Social networks; Executive careers; Banking; Corporate governance; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; BOARD; NETWORKS; DIRECTORS; GENDER; PERFORMANCE; COMPETITION; ECONOMICS; WOMEN;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.01.040
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
020219 [财政学(含:税收学)];
摘要
We exploit a unique sample to analyze how homophily (affinity for similar others) and social ties affect career outcomes in banking. We test if these factors increase the probability that the appointee to an executive board is an outsider without previous employment at the bank compared to being an insider. Homophily based on age and gender increase the chances of the outsider appointments. Similar educational backgrounds, in contrast, reduce the chance that the appointee is an outsider. Greater social ties also increase the probability of an outside appointment. Results from a duration model show that larger age differences shorten tenure significantly, whereas gender similarities barely affect tenure. Differences in educational backgrounds affect tenure differently across the banking sectors. Maintaining more contacts to the executive board reduces tenure. We also find weak evidence that social ties are associated with reduced profitability, consistent with cronyism in banking. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:2087 / 2105
页数:19
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