Wayne, Horwich, and evidential diversity

被引:13
作者
Fitelson, B
机构
[1] Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706
关键词
D O I
10.1086/289982
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
In a recent article, Wayne (1995) offers a critique of Horwich's (1982) Bayesian explication of the confirmational significance of evidential diversity. Presently, I argue that Wayne's reconstruction of Horwich's account is not faithful to Horwich's original presentation. Because Wayne's reconstruction is uncharitable, his criticisms turn out to be off the mark. I try to provide a more faithful and charitable rendition of Horwich's account. Unfortunately, even this more charitable reconstruction of Horwich's position seems-at best-to provide an incomplete explication of the confirmational significance of evidential diversity.
引用
收藏
页码:652 / 660
页数:9
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