Do directors perform for pay?

被引:230
作者
Adams, Renee B. [1 ,2 ]
Ferreira, Daniel [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Queensland, UQ Business Sch, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia
[2] ECGI, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia
[3] London Sch Econ, CEPR, London WC2A 2AE, England
[4] ECGI, London WC2A 2AE, England
关键词
directors; executive compensation; incentives; attendance; board meetings;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.06.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Many corporations reward their outside directors with a modest fee for each board meeting they attend. Using a large panel data set on director attendance behavior in publicly-listed firms for the period 1996-2003, we provide robust evidence that directors are less likely to have attendance problems at board meetings when board meeting fees are higher. This is surprising since meeting fees, on average roughly $1,000, represent an arguably small fraction of the total wealth of a representative director in our sample. Thus, corporate directors appear to perform for even very small financial rewards. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:154 / 171
页数:18
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