The conceptual bases of metaphors of dirt and cleanliness in moral and non-moral reasoning

In this paper I propose a new understanding of the often-noted phenomenon that much of our conceptualization and reasoning about moral propriety is framed by a set of metaphors that originate from a conceptual structure generated from our experiences with dirt and cleanliness. I argue that reliance on the dirty-clean dichotomy to conceptualize moral propriety or impropriety emerges from metaphorical extensions into various realms of experience (e.g., sports, governance, introspection) grounded in an idealized cognitive model in which dirt is conceptualized as matter out of place and clean is conceptualized as ordered arrangement. The analysis provides a unified framework with which to understand the use of dirty and clean as metaphors to categorize objects, events and actions in the moral domain. Finally, I suggest that the dirty-clean distinction is useful for understanding broader cultural issues (such as moral panics regarding media, immigration and disease), and I show that the conceptualization of certain non-moral properties can be understood using the same framework (e.g., the quality of being exceptional) of objects and actions.