Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures and securitization

被引:94
作者
Adelino, Manuel [1 ]
Gerardi, Kristopher [2 ]
Willen, Paul S. [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Duke Univ, Dukes Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27708 USA
[2] Fed Reserve Bank Atlanta, Dept Res, Atlanta, GA 30309 USA
[3] Fed Reserve Bank Boston, Res Dept, Boston, MA 02210 USA
[4] Fed Reserve Bank Boston, NBER, Boston, MA 02210 USA
关键词
Securitization; Mortgage; Foreclosure; Renegotiation; Asymmetric information; DEBT; DEFAULT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.08.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
A leading explanation for the lack of widespread mortgage renegotiation is the existence of frictions in the mortgage securitization process. This paper finds similarly small renegotiation rates for securitized loans and loans held on banks' balance sheets that become seriously delinquent, in particular during the early part of the financial crisis. We argue that information issues endemic to home mortgages, where lenders negotiate with large numbers of borrowers, lead to barriers in renegotiation. Consistent with the theory, renegotiation rates are strongly negatively correlated with the degree of informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders over the course of the crisis. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:835 / 853
页数:19
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