The allocation and effectiveness of China's R&D subsidies - Evidence from listed firms

被引:368
作者
Boeing, Philipp [1 ]
机构
[1] Ctr European Econ Res ZEW, L7 1, D-68161 Mannheim, Germany
关键词
China; R&D subsidies; Economic transition; Propensity score matching; Conditional difference-in-differences; PUBLIC SUBSIDIES; INNOVATION; PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP; STIMULATE; PROGRAMS;
D O I
10.1016/j.respol.2016.05.007
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
In this study we investigate the allocation of China's R&D subsidies and their effectiveness in stimulating business R&D investments for the population of Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2006. With respect to subsidy allocation, we find that firm selection is mainly determined by prior grants, high quality inventions, and minority state-ownership. Market-oriented provincial governments distribute grants less frequently, and firms located in developed provinces receive, grants more often. Considering effectiveness, R&D subsidies instantaneously crowd-out business R&D investment but are neutral in later periods. In 2006, one public RMB reduces business R&D investments by half an RMB. However, crowding out is not prevalent for repeated recipients of R&D subsidies, high-tech firms, and minority state-owned firms. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1774 / 1789
页数:16
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